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JOSEPH S. NYE, JR. AND DAVID A. WELCH, 
UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL CONFLICTS AND 
COOPERATION, 9th ed. 
STUDY GUIDE, 2012 
Steven Alan Samson 
 
CHAPTER ONE:  ARE THERE ENDURING LOGICS OF 
CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN WORLD POLITICS? 
 
Outline 
 
A. WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL POLITICS?  (3-5) 
 1. World Imperial System 
a. Western: Roman, Spanish, French, British 
  b. Regional Empires: Sumerian, Persian, Chinese 
 2. Feudal System 
  a. Crosscutting, Non-Territorial Loyalties and Conflicts 
 3. Anarchic System of States 
  a. Examples 
   1) City-States 
   2) Dynastic Territorial States 
  b. Absence of a Common Sovereign 
   1) Self-Help System 
   2) Thomas Hobbes: State of Nature 
  c. Domestic (Municipal) vs. International Politics and Law 
   1) Domestic Monopoly on the Use of Force vs. International 
     Anarchy 
   2) Domestic Sense of Community vs. Absence of a Common 
     Loyalty 
   3) Result: Gap between Order and Justice 
 4. This Last System (Anarchic or Westphalian) Is the Most Relevant to 
   Contemporary International Politics 
B. DIFFERING VIEWS OF ANARCHIC POLITICS  (5-11) 
 1. Political Philosophy: Two Views 
  a. Thomas Hobbes: Emphasis on Insecurity, Force, and Survival 
  b. John Locke: People Can Make Contracts 
  c. They are the precursors of realism and liberalism 
 2. International Politics: Two Current Views 
  a. Realism is the dominant tradition; it is more pessimistic: e.g., Henry 
    Kissinger [Hans Morgenthau was a leading theorist] 
b. Liberalism (often called idealism), the more optimistic tradition, traces 
back to Baron Montesquieu, Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham, John 
Stuart Mill, and Woodrow Wilson 
 3. Presuppositions 
a. Liberals emphasize economic and social interdependence 
(1) They see a global society that functions alongside the states 
and sets part of the context for states (e.g., trade, the UN) 
b. Realists claim liberals overstate the difference between domestic and 
international politics 
4. Realist Rejoinder: “A State of War Does Not Mean Constant War” 
5. Resurgence of Liberal Claims in the 1970s and 1980s 
a. Richard Rosecrance: States can increase their power either 
aggressively by territorial conquest or peacefully through trade 
(1) Illustration: Japan 
 6. Ecological Interdependence: Vision of a World Without Borders 
  a. Ozone depletion 
  b. AIDS and drugs 
  c. Richard Falk anticipates new non-territorial loyalties 
  d. Transnational forces are undoing the Peace of Westphalia 
 7. Realist Rebuttal: Critique of “globaloney” [Russell Kirk coined the term] 
 8. Other Approaches 
  a. Marxism: economic reductionism, historical materialism 
   1) Analytical weaknesses 
  b. Dependency Theory  
1) But once peripheral countries of the Pacific Rim become 
economic tigers in the 1980s and 1990s 
2)  Cardoso changed to a free market view and served as the 
     Brazilian president 
  c. Kenneth Waltz: Neo-realism 
  d. Robert Keohane: Neo-liberalism 
 9. Constructivists 
  a. Concepts are socially constructed, subjective, and impermanent [cf. 
    medieval nominalism, deconstruction, and Chomsky’s deep structures] 
  b. Focus on ideas and culture 
  c. Understanding of “security” evolves 
  d. Feminist critiques 
  e. Debates over basic concepts: sovereignty, humanitarian intervention, etc 
  f. John Maynard Keynes’ dead scribblers 
C. BUILDING BLOCKS  (11-16) 
 1. Actors 
  a. States 
  b. Non-state actors 
   (1) TNCs or MNCs (multinational corporations) 
  c. Middle East as an Illustration 
   (1) MNCs 
   (2) IGOs (intergovernmental organizations) 
   (3) NGOs (non-governmental organizations) 
   (4) Transnational ethnic groups such as the Kurds 
 2. Goals 
  a. National security 
 3. Instruments 
  a. Stanley Hoffmann: Link between military strength and positive 
    achievement has been loosened 
b. Reasons 
(1) Nuclear weapons 
(2) Expense of conventional forces 
(3) Internal constraints 
(4) Alternatives to force 
  c. Basic game of security goes on 
   (1) Hegemonic states 
   (2) Hegemonic wars 
   (3) New treaty sets the new framework of order: e.g., the Treaty of 
     Utrecht, 1713; the Congress of Vienna, 1815; and the United 
     Nations system, 1945 
D. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR  (16) 
1. Thucydides: The Father of Realism 
a. Strategos=general 
E. A SHORT VERSION OF A LONG STORY  (17-19) 
1. Initial Alliance of the Greece City-States during the Persians Wars 
2. Athenian Empire 
  a. Delian League 
3. Civil War in Epidamnus 
  a. Democrats sought help from Corcyra [the metropolis=mother city] but 
were turned down 
b. Democrats turned to Corinth, an Athenian rival, but the Corcyreans sent 
a fleet to recapture their former colony and defeated the Corinthian fleet 
  c. Corinth declared war and Corcyra turned to Athens for help 
4. Athenian Dilemma: Break truce or allow a shift in the power balance? 
  a. Athenians pursued a deterrence strategy: show of force against Corinth 
    did not succeed in forcing Corinth to back down 
  b. Corinth stirred up problems in Potidaea, which was an Athenian ally 
  c. Sparta had promised aid to Corinth if Athens attacked Potidaea 
  d. Athens sent forces to put down an uprising 
 5. Great Debate in Sparta 
  a. Spartans voted in favor of war in order maintain the balance of power 
    by checking the increase of Athenian power 
6. War (431-404 BC) 
a. Peace of Nicias 
b. Disastrous Sicilian Expedition 
c. Four Hundred Oligarchs 
d. Athenian Defeat 
F. CAUSES AND THEORIES  (19-21) 
1. What Made War Inevitable 
2. Pericles 
3. Athens’ Security Dilemma 
  a. Security dilemmas are characteristic of anarchic organization 
 4. Prisoner’s Dilemma 
  a. Cooperation 
  b. Issues of Trust and Credibility 
 5. Balance of Naval Power 
 6. Question of Cheating 
G. INEVITABILITY AND THE SHADOW OF THE FUTURE  (21-24) 
1. Belief in War’s Inevitability as a Cause 
2. Robert Axelrod 
a. Tit-for-Tat strategy 
3. Belief in the Inevitability of War Is Corrosive in International Politics 
  a. If you suspect your opponent will cheat, you rely on yourself 
 4. Thucydides’ View of Human Nature 
  a. Donald Kagan contends that Thucydides erred; Sparta feared a slave 
    revolt more than it feared Athens 
b. Kagan’s Conclusion: Precipitating Causes – Policy Mistakes by the Chief 
  Actors – Were More Important 
 5. Very Little Is Truly Inevitable in History 
  a. Marx: Men make history but not in conditions of their own choosing 
  b. Prisoner’s dilemma situations 
6. Modern Lessons 
a. Be aware of both regularities and changes 
b. Beware of patently shallow historical analogies 
c. Be aware of the selectivity of historians 
d. Historians are affected by their contemporary concerns; consequently 
the questions they ask change 
7. The Cure to Misunderstanding History Is to Read More, Not Less 
H. ETHICAL QUESTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS  (25-26) 
1. Uses of Moral Arguments 
a. They move and constrain people 
   (1) e.g., Corcyra’s appeal 
b. They are used rhetorically as propaganda to disguise less elevated 
   motives 
(1) e.g., the Melian Debate 
 2. The Basic Touchstone for Moral Arguments Is Impartiality 
 3. Kantian Tradition (deontological emphasizes duties and rules) vs. the Utilitarian 
   Tradition (consequentialist); some add Virtue Ethics (aretaic) 
4. Moral Arguments Can Be Judged in Three Ways: 
a. Motives or intentions involved 
b. Means used 
c. Consequences or net effects 
I. LIMITS ON ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  (26-27) 
1. Weak International Consensus on Values 
2. Different Standards of Behavior: Private vs. Public 
a. Collective abstractions like the State not held to the same standard 
3. Complexity of Causation 
  a. Oxford Union debate, 1933 
  b. Hamburger argument 
 4. Order and Justice Are Both Important 
  a. Absence of institutions to preserve the order that precedes justice 
J. THREE VIEWS OF THE ROLE OF MORALITY  (27-34) 
1. Skeptics 
a. Example: Thucydides 
   (1) Melian Debate: might makes right 
b. Morality Requires Choice 
c. Criticisms: Some Choices 
   (1) Thomas Hobbes: balance of power 
   (2) International law and customs 
(3) International organizations 
d. Just War Doctrine in Wartime 
   (1) Answer to pacifism 
e. Why Complete Skepticism May Be Rejected 
f. Realists Who Are Not Complete Skeptics 
   (1) Emphasis on order 
   (2) Moral crusades disrupt balances of power [cf. Thomas Hobbes 
     and Reinhold Niebuhr] 
g. Tradeoffs between Order and Justice 
 2. State Moralists 
  a. Example: Michael Walzer 
   (1) States represent the pooled rights of individuals 
  b. A Society of States with Certain Rules 
(1) Sovereignty: Good fences make good neighbors 
(2) Frequent violations 
  c. Intervention is a long-standing problem 
   (1) Examples of Panama and Kuwait 
 3. Cosmopolitans 
  a. Need to focus on distributive justice 
   (1) Problem of the “brain drain” 
  b. National boundaries have no moral standing 
  c. Limited cosmopolitan view looks at people’s multiple loyalties: 
   pluralism 
  d. Different responses to Rwanda and Darfur 
4. Strengths and Weaknesses of Each Approach 
  a. Outrage may lead to heightened risk 
  d. The issues recur throughout history 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. What Is International Politics?  Identify three basic forms of world politics.  Identify the 
chief varieties of the anarchic system of states.  What does the author mean by calling 
international politics “a self-help system?”  What is life like in Thomas Hobbes’s state of 
nature?  Identify two ways international law differs from domestic law?  With what result?  
(3-5) 
 
2. Differing Views of Anarchic Politics  Identify the two major traditions in thinking about 
international politics that in some ways began with Hobbes and Locke.  Who are some of 
the leading exponents of each?  What is the central perception of each?  What are some 
of the arguments pro and con?  Identify five other approaches.  How do constructivists 
differ from neorealists and neoliberals?  What is the practical importance of theories?  (5-
11) 
 
3. Building Blocks  Identify three concepts that are basic to theorizing about international 
politics.  How is each concept changing?  (For example, actors include not only states but 
also IGOs, NGOs, and transnational ethnic groups).  Identify three changes in the role of 
force.  What other factors may play a larger role than force?  How is the balance of 
power supposed to work?  What are hegemonic wars and how are they resolved?  (11-
16) 
 
4. The Peloponnesian War  Summarize the key events and circumstances that led to the 
Second Peloponnesian War.  What was Athens’s dilemma?  (16-19)  
 
5. Causes and Theories  What did Thucydides believe caused the war?  What was the 
view of Pericles?  What is a security dilemma?  What is the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
scenario in game theory?  What was Athens’s security dilemma, as described by the 
Corcyraeans?  (19-21) 
 
6. Inevitability and the Shadow of the Future  What does Robert Axelrod believe to be 
the most effective strategy in Prisoner’s Dilemma?  What does it take to develop trust?  
(Trust is the title of a recent book by Francis Fukuyama).  Compare Donald Kagan’s view 
of the precipitating causes with Thucydides’s theory of inevitability.  What three lessons 
may be drawn from this ancient history.  How did Thucydides’s questions differ from 
those we might ask today?  (21-24) 
 
7. Ethical Questions and International Poliics  How may moral arguments be used?  
What views did the Athenians and Melians take in 416 BC?  With what result (p. 22)?  
Contrast the Kantian (intrinsic ethical norms, duties) with the utilitarian (constructivist or 
consequentialist ethical norms) tradition.  [Aristotelian virtue ethics is not considered].  
Identify three ways moral arguments may be judged.  (25-26) 
 
8. Limits on Ethics in International Relations  Identify four reasons why ethics plays less 
of a role in international than in domestic politics.  Why is the “hamburger argument” 
unsound?  (26-27) 
 
9. Three Views of the Role of Morality  Identify three different views of ethics in 
international relations.  Which views do realists tend to take?  Idealists?  Give three 
reasons why the argument of skeptics is inadequate.  According to Thomas Hobbes, 
what does escaping the state of nature require?  What role may be played by 
international law and customs?   International organizations?  What takes priority: justice 
or order?  What is the problem with moral crusades?  (27-31) 
 10. What are the chief considerations for state moralists?  What circumstances might justify 
intervention?  What are the chief considerations for cosmopolitans?  What is distributive 
justice?  What are the strengths and weaknesses of each view?  What is the place of 
morality?  [In the Morgenthau reading later, we will consider the issue of morality from a 
classical realist perspective].  What has changed since the time of Thucydides?  (31-34)    
 
Review 
 
world imperial system  feudalism   anarchy 
city-states   territorial dynasties 
anarchic system of states international politics as a self-help system 
balance of power  hegemonic state   nonstate actor 
NGOs, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)   Thomas Hobbes' state of nature 
John Locke    Immanuel Kant   Jeremy Bentham 
Athens's security dilemma moral crusades   strategos (general) 
Thucydides   Pericles   Prisoner's Dilemma 
Second Peloponnesian War Corinthians   Epidamnians 
Melians (Melian dialogue) Corcyraeans    realism 
reasons ethics plays less of a role in international than domestic politics  
dependency theory  liberalism   constructivism 
views of the role of morality skeptics   state moralists 
cosmopolitans   three basic forms of world politics 
 
CHAPTER TWO:  EXPLAINING CONFLICT AND 
COOPERATION: TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES OF THE 
TRADE 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. States, Nations, and Nation-States  What makes the concept of the sovereign state the 
most important in the study of world politics?  What are the two crucial characteristics of 
the state?  Abraham Lincoln’s use of the word nation indicates that he believed America 
to be a new kind of nation.  What is a nation-state?  In the absence of self-determination, 
many ethnic groups, such as the Welsh and the Catalonians, enjoy the privileges of 
devolution (a degree of autonomy).  What issues are considered in order to determine 
whether to recognize a new sovereign state?  Macedonia, Puntland, South Sudan, 
Abkhazia, and Azawad all claim independence, but how should we regard failed states?  
(38-42) 
 
2. International Actors, Power, and Authority  What makes states the most important 
  actors?  Define: power, power conversion, power resources, hard power vs. soft 
  power.  How has power been transformed in the age of information-based economies 
  and transnational interdependence?  (42-47) 
 
3. International System and International Society  What is an international system? 
  What are its two major components?  Although its ordering principle is anarchic, why is 
the system not chaotic?   How did Chancellor Otto von Bismarck engineer the Franco-
Prussian War?  (47-49) 
 
4. System Stability and Crisis Stability  Why are distributions of power crucial to system 
stability?  How do the different types of polarity work?  Why was the Cold War system 
stable?  A previous edition summarized the importance of process of an international 
system.  It is determined by: (1) its structure (bipolar structures tend to produce less 
flexible processes), (2) the cultural and institutional context that surrounds the structure 
and determines the incentives and capabilities states have for cooperation, and (3) 
whether the states are revolutionary or moderate in their goals and instruments.”  (49-51) 
 
5. The “National Interest”  Proximity to a Hobbesian situation is an important variable. 
 James Chowning Davies showed how Maslow’s hierarchy of needs reflects degrees of 
  security as a variable.  (51-52) 
 
6. Levels of Analysis  What are some of its intangible aspects?  In light of the issue of 
morality (p. 28), why are the unintended consequences of a system (such as the market 
system) important?  How did the existing international system affect Bolshevik behavior?  
[Revolutionaries sometimes refer to the pattern as “co-optation,” which justifies destroy 
existing institutions].  What is the geopolitical view of the distribution of power among 
states, as understood by Kautilya and Machiavelli?  What accounts for a checkerboard 
pattern?  (52-54) 
 
7. The Individual Level  Identify three levels of causation (Kenneth Waltz’s “images”). 
What does Nye mean by overprediction or unfalsifiable explanations?  [The 
philosopher Karl Popper developed the “falsifiability” theory].   
(54-57) 
 
8. The State Level  How may the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the onset 
  of the Austro-Hungarian War, and the end of the Cold War be understood at the state 
  level (i.e., domestic politics)?  How did Karl Marx and classical liberals like Richard 
  Cobden view the relationship between capitalism and war or peace?  How well did 
  Marxist and liberal theories account for the onset of the First World War and other events 
  based on domestic politics?  The term bureaucratic politics was popularized in Graham 
  Allison’s study of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  How does it shed light on the origin of WWI? 
  What is Miles’s Law?  (57-58) 
 
9. Systems: Structure and Process  What is William Occam’s rule of parsimony? 
  Kenneth Waltz’s concept of system focuses on what aspect of a system?   What parallels 
  can you find between monopoly, oligopoly, and perfect markets, and the earlier 
  discussion on pages 47 and 50 of unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar systems?  How does 
  the logic of Hobbesian vs. non-Hobbesian systems differ?  (59-61) 
 
10. Paradigms and Theories  The term paradigm was popularized by Thomas Kuhn’s The 
  Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  What are hypotheses and axioms?  (62) 
 
11. Realism  What are some of the varieties of realists?  Classical realists would be 
  considered soft; Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism would be considered hard.  Lord 
  Palmerston appears to say that there is not an immutable logic to world politics.  (62-64)  
 
12. Liberalism  Why were liberal theories discredited?  What are the three strands of  
recent liberal thinking?  Why is trade important?  Illustrate with the case of Japan in the 
1930s, as noted by Eugene Staley, and recently.  According to neoliberals, why do 
international organizations matter?  How do institutions stabilize expectations?  What did 
Karl Deutsch mean by “pluralistic security communities?”  What circumstances might 
cause security dilemmas to reemerge in Europe?  Are democracies less apt to go to war? 
Why did Kant believe so?  According to Michael Doyle, why do liberal democracies 
not fight other liberal democracies?  Here a distinction might be made: a mere 
plebiscitary democracy differs from a liberal democracy in lacking stable and mature 
democratic institutions? 
 
13. Marxism  What are some of the weaknesses of Marxism?  (69) 
 14. Constructivism  What are the crucial insights of constructivism?  What is path- 
dependency?  (69-71) 
 
15. Counterfactuals  What are they?  How may they be used to define causal claims? 
   Identify four criteria that can be used to test counterfactual thought experiments.  (72-75) 
  
Review 
 
sovereignty   territoriality   nation-state 
self-determination  five issues   actor 
power    power conversion  hard power 
soft power   authority   unipolar 
bipolar    multipolar   hegemon 
system    structure and process   Richard Cobden  
Kautilya   overprediction   strands of liberal thinking 
neoliberals   expectations of stability   liberal democracies 
levels of analysis (causation)   Marxist and liberals on relationship between war and capitalism 
Miles’s Law   Occam's razor   rule of parsimony  
paradigm   hypotheses   Lord Palmerston 
poorly integrated countries Japan's behavior in the 1930s Eugene Staley 
ideologies of nationalism and democracy   Michael Doyle 
low-level generalization about variations in foreign policy  path dependency 
counterfactuals 
   
CHAPTER THREE:  FROM WESTPHALIA TO WORLD 
WAR I 
 
Study Questions 
 
PART A  
 
1. Revolutionary and Moderate Goals and Instruments  What were the two largest 
political units of all time?  What is Europe’s most successful export?  What has been 
accomplished by the Peace of Westphalia (1648)?  What is Charles Tilly’s view?  How 
did Britain happen to become the greatest power in the 19th century over such rivals as 
the Netherlands and France?  What were the rules of the game in the eighteenth century 
(a period defined in part by the Treaty of Utrecht)?  Why did states’ goals change?  How 
did the Napoleonic Wars change the process or means?  What makes the French 
Revolution exogenous to a structural theory?  How did technology change the means?  
The French revolutionary levée en masse (conscription) marked a radical departure from 
professional armies and became the norm during the First World War.  (78-81) 
 
2. Managing of Great Power Conflict: Balance of Power  Compare and contrast David 
Hume’s, Richard Cobden’s, and Woodrow Wilson’s ideas about the balance of 
power.  Following the unprecedented Thirty Years War (1618-1648), the ten hegemonic 
wars that followed the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) were: the War of the League of 
Augsburg (1689-1697); the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713); the War of 
the Austrian Succession (1740-1748); the Seven Years War (also the Third Silesian 
War, 1756-1763); the War of American Independence (1775-1763); the War of the 
First Coalition against France (1792-1797); the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815); the 
First World War (1914-1918); the Second World War (1939-1945), and the Cold War, 
of which the war on terror may be only the most recent phase.  Why do states balance 
power?  (58-59) 
 
3. Balances as Distributions of Power  Identify three meanings of balance of power. 
   What is the hegemonic stability theory?  [Its opposite is the hegemonic transition 
  theory].  What dog did not bark in 1895 [over disputed territorial claims between 
  Venezuela and British Guiana]?  (82-83) 
 
4.   Balance of Power as Policy  How did Lord Palmerston and Winston Churchill articulate 
  and Sir Edward Grey practice the policy of balancing?  Why are alliances form and why 
  do they collapse?  (83)   
 
5. Balance of Power as Theory  What is bandwagoning?  Why is it risky in international 
 politics?  What does balance-of-power theory predict?  Identify five reasons countries join 
  the stronger rather than the weaker side.  (84-86) 
 
6. Balance of Power as Multipolar Systems  What are the distinguishing features of a 
classical balance of power system?  (86) 
 
7. The Nineteenth-Century Balance of Power System  What changes resulted from the 
Congress of Vienna?  Identify the three structural phases.  When did the big structural 
change occur?  Why did it not produce instability?  How did the balance of power system 
following German unification break down?  Identify five periods in the process of the 
nineteenth-century balance of power system [known as the Pax Britannica]. What were 
the hallmarks of Bismarck’s alliance system?  What were the most important trends that 
drove change?  The Concert of Europe, which was led by Prince Metternich of Austria, 
sought to suppress even liberal reform in Europe.  Although the Revolutions of 1848 were 
all suppressed, the old system that had sowed the wind and reaped the whirlwind was 
quickly swept away. (86-90) 
 
8. A Modern Sequel  How has the German problem changed over the years?  What made 
  possible Germany’s reunification?  Identify three ways things have changed.  (91) 
 
PART B 
 
1. The Origins of World War I  Identify some of the major international consequences of 
  the First World War.  (94) 
 
2. Three Levels of Analysis  What were the two key structural changes at the systems 
  level of analysis?  What role was played by: the Tirpitz Plan, the Boer War, the Crowe 
  memorandum?  When did Britain stop playing the critical role of balancer (maintainer of 
  the balance of power)?  What was the effect of the Triple Entente?  Identify four 
  changes in the process?  [Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn has a different insight into the “Dear 
  Nicky” letter, noting that Nicholas was deceived by two of his generals].  [Correction: 
  Herbert Spencer articulated the “survival of the fittest” philosophy].  Why does Lenin’s 
imperialist theory fail to explain what happened at Fashoda in 1898?  Why did the rise of 
nationalism in the Balkans prove so threatening?  According to Fritz Fischer, why did the 
Coalition of Rye and Iron favor German expansionism?  What is meant by the “cult of 
the offensive”?   How did the personalities of Franz Josef, Count Berchtold, Nicholas 
II, and Wilhelm II contribute to the tragedy?  (94-100) 
 
3. Was War Inevitable?  What were the deep causes of the First World War?  The 
  intermediate causes?  The precipitating cause?  What was the Schlieffen Plan? 
   What possibly would have made its assumptions obsolete by 1916?  (100-03) 
 
4. What Kind of War?  Counterfactually, what four other wars were possible? [Incidentally, 
  United States entry into the war came shortly after the British intercepted the 
  Zimmermann note, which offered Mexico incentives to ally itself with Germany if the 
  Americans entered the war].  What three lessons does the author draw?  (103-04) 
 
5. The Funnel of Choices  The authors neglect to mention that at the time of the 
  assassination of Franz Ferdinand in June 1914, the German Navy was holding a grand 
  review during Kiel Week. A British naval squadron paid a visit and Kaiser Wilhelm toured 
  a British dreadnought wearing a Royal Navy admiral's uniform.  (104-07) 
 
6. Lessons of History Again  What point made by constructivists do some realists miss? 
  (107) 
 
APPENDICES TO PART B:  OTHER TAKES ON THESE ISSUES   
 
1. Eyre Crowe, Memorandum, January 1, 1907 
 
Either Germany is definitely aiming at a general political hegemony and maritime 
ascendancy, threatening the independence of her neighbours and ultimately the 
existence of England; Or Germany, free from any such clear-cut ambition, and 
thinking for the present merely of using her legitimate position and influence as 
one of the leading Powers in the council of nations, is seeking to promote her 
foreign commerce, spread the benefits of German culture, extend the scope of 
her national energies, and create fresh German interests all over the world 
wherever and whenever a peaceful opportunity offers. . . . It will, however, be 
seen, upon reflection, that there is no actual necessity for a British Government 
to determine definitely which of the two theories of German policy it will accept.  
For it is clear that the second scheme (of semi-independent evolution, not 
entirely unaided by statecraft) may at any stage merge into the first, or 
conscious-design scheme.  Moreover, if ever the evolution scheme should come 
to be realized, the position thereby accruing to Germany would obviously 
constitute as formidable a menace to the rest of the world as would be presented 
by any deliberate conquest of a similar position by “malice aforethought.” 
 
2. Donald Kagan 
 
Bismarck’s unification of the Germans under the leadership of Prussia was an 
astonishing achievement.  His ability to solidify the place of the new and 
threatening entity in a European system shattered by its emergence and to 
create a new international order in which Germany could live in peace and 
prosper may have been even more remarkable.  For the two decades after 1871 
that he remained in power there were no wars among the great powers.  Even 
after he was dismissed in 1890 by the new German emperor, William II, it took 
his successors another quarter of a century to undo and reverse his policies and 
so distort the system he created as to produce a major war. 
 
Bismarck’s second great achievement rested, in part, on Germany’s strong 
military and industrial power, which gave his policies weight and respect. . . . 
Central to his goal was the need to convince the other powers that Germany was 
what he repeatedly asserted: a “saturated” power that needed to turn inward to 
consolidate in peace what had been gained in three swift wars. 
 
[Following the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, the first and most important part of 
Bismarck’s system to be sacrificed was a flexible accommodation (the 
Reinsurance Treaty) with the Russians that kept them isolated from France and 
kept Germany from becoming too closely linked to Austrian ambitions.  A few 
years later the two-front Schlieffen Plan grew in response to a Franco-Russian 
alliance that Bismarck had so skillfully prevented]. 
 
3. David W. Ziegler 
 
German preparation for war followed the Schlieffen Plan, which rested on several 
assumptions.  One was that any major war in Europe would be for the Germans 
a two-front war, against Russia in the east and France in the west.  Another 
assumption was that the huge Russian army would be impossible to defeat; the 
most the Germans could hope to do would be to keep the Russian army from 
defeating them.  The one advantage that the Germans had, the Schlieffen Plan 
assumed, was technological superiority, particularly the ability to mobilize quickly.  
They assumed they could mobilize in two weeks; the Russians, with more 
territory and a less-developed railroad network, would need six weeks.  
Therefore, the Schlieffen Plan called for a major offensive first against France, to 
knock it out of the war before turning the German army to the more difficult task 
of fighting the Russian army.  For this reason, the Russian mobilization was 
greeted with alarm in Berlin.  If the Schlieffen Plan were to work (and for all 
practical purposes it was the only plan the Germans had), then it was essential 
that the Germans begin mobilizing as soon as the Russians did.  Otherwise they 
would lose the advantage afforded them by their superior technology.  Never 
mind that the Russian mobilization was directed against Austria.  The crucial 
factor, in German eyes, was mobilization. 
 
Thus when the Germans in their turn delivered an ultimatum to Russia on July 
31, demanding that they demobilize, it was not so much in defense of Austria as 
in defense of their own strategic situation.  When Russia  declined to demobilize, 
the Germans mobilized.  The French, realizing what was coming, did so too. . . . 
 
The connecting thread, from the assassination in Sarajevo to the German attack 
on France, was military planning. 
 
4. Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn: 
 
[At the end of the war the Reichstag appointed a commission to determine 
responsibility for the war.  Dr. Arthur Rosenberg, a Social Democrat who headed 
the commission, exonerated Wilhelm II almost completely.  Erik von Kuehnelt-
Leddihn describes the emperor as] a gifted but rather loud-mouthed and most 
undiplomatic ruler. . . . He was a victim of too much adulation and misinformation, 
but was by no means a villain, as Walter Rathenau has pointed out. . . . 
 
Harry Elmer Barnes, an American historian who tried to assess the guilt for this 
silliest of all major wars, named Serbia first, Russia second, Austria-Hungary 
third, France fourth, the German Reich fifth, and Britain sixth.  What could have 
been a local intervention by Austria-Hungary against Serbia was transformed into 
a pan-European war by the actions of two Russians, War Minister Sukhomlinov 
and General Yanushyévich, chief of the Russian general staff.  They lied 
constantly to their emperor about their mobilization not only along the Austrian, 
but also along the German frontier.  An exchange of telegrams between “Willy” 
and “Nicky” (unfortunately, there was no “hot line” yet) caused the Kaiser to 
believe that his cousin and friend was trying to deceive him.  He thereupon 
declared war on Russia.  (Footnote: The Bolsheviks tried Yanushkievitch and 
Sukhomlinov in 1918 – at that time a fair trial was still possible.  Both insisted that 
they had acted as patriots.  In retrospect it become clear that they acted less as 
patriots than as faithful servants of France.  Lord Grey was very right when he 
wrote: “Let it never be forgotten that it was the energy and tremendous sacrifice 
with which Russia made this advance [i.e. into East Prussia] that saved the Allies 
in the summer of 1914. . . . The whole-hearted efforts and all the strength of 
Russia were needed in the early stages to save the Allies”).  Russia was tied to 
France by a military alliance; and thus began a war that could have been ended 
by a compromise as late as 1917, which would have saved us the misery Europe 
has been living in ever since.  But the American intervention made compromise 
impossible.  The Germans, most of the time victorious in this war about Austria-
Hungary, were forced to their knees primarily by the hunger blockade. 
 
Appendices Review, Part B 
 
two theories of German policy Bismarck’s achievements hazards of the Schlieffen Plan 
war guilt  
 
Nye Review, Part A 
 
examples of revolutionary goals and instruments 
the idea of popular sovereignty as spread by Napoleon through Europe 
Frederick the Great's seizure of Silesia from Maria Theresa 
the once popular notion in France that all monarchs should be executed 
the French use of the levée en masse instead of mercenaries 
David Hume   Woodrow Wilson  Richard Cobden 
hegemonic stability theory realpolitik   alliances  
balance of power strategy  bandwagoning phenomenon exceptions to balance of power 
1815-1822: the Concert of Europe 1822-1854: the rise of nationalism and democracy 
1854-1870: nationalism and the unification of Italy and Germany  Count Berchtold 
1870-1890: Bismarck's alliance system [a revived Concert]  Emperor Franz Josef 
 
Nye Review, Part B 
 
causes of World War I: key factors at the individual and structural levels of analysis 
changes in the process  Kaiser Wilhelm II   Czar Nicholas II  
confrontation at Fashoda Germany's Coalition of Rye and Iron   
corruption of the Ottoman government    complacency about peace 
rise of German power   rigidity of the alliance system rise of nationalism 
Austria's desire to prevent disintegration    Tirpitz Plan 
Schlieffen Plan 
 
CHAPTER FOUR:  THE FAILURE OF COLLECTIVE 
SECURITY AND WORLD WAR II 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. The Rise and Fall of Collective Security: The League of Nations  What change was 
Woodrow Wilson determined to introduce into the international system (which is 
reflected in his famous 14 Points)?  Identify the three major points of the collective 
security system?  Identify three ways in which it differed from the balance of power 
approach.  What were some of the ambiguities in the Covenant of the League of 
Nations?  What was its understanding of international law?  (112-14) 
 
2. The United States and the League of Nations  [American opponents of the Versailles 
  Treaty were divided into two camps: reservationists and irreconcilables].  Henry Cabot 
  Lodge, a political ally of the late Theodore Roosevelt, led the reservationists. 
   [Intellectual animosity long characterized the relationship between Wilson and Lodge]. 
 (114-15) 
    
3. The Early Days of the League  What did the French want?  The British?  Why did the 
  French form alliances with Poland and the Little Entente?  What was the state of 
  Germany after the war?  How did the Versailles Treaty make things worse?  Why were 
  the Italians unhappy with the peace (consider the Treaty of London)?  What 
commitments did Germany make in the Treaty of Locarno?  What was the Kellogg-
Briand Pact? (115-18) 
 
4. The Manchurian Failure, the Ethiopian Debacle  Why did collective security fail in 
  Manchuria and Ethiopia?  [Discrimination against Japan by the United States in the 
  Washington Conference’s 5:5:3:1:1 formula for postwar naval size was also a sore point]. 
   Why did the sanctions against Italy finally take a back seat in 1936?  [The Haitian 
  delegate showed a real understanding of Thomas Hobbes’s point about equality in the 
  state of nature].  (118-21) 
 
5. The Origins of World War II: Hitler’s War?  How was the German problem solved after 
  the Second World War?  What kind of war did Hitler want?  What is the significance of 
  the Hossbach memorandum?  (121-23) 
 
6.   Hitler’s Strategy  What were Hitler’s four options when he came to power in 1933? 
    Identify the four phases in which he pursued the fourth option.  How did Hitler 
  outmaneuver his foes at Stresa and in the Rhineland?  [The Anschluss is the name given 
  Hitler’s seizure of Austria in 1938].  What excuse did Hitler use to justify seizing the 
  Sudetenland?  The Munich Conference is now synonymous with the word 
  “appeasement” (see pp. 107-08).  Hitler’s “brilliant diplomatic coup” (p. 97) was the 
  Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, an alliance of two predatory regimes.  The seizure of western 
  Poland in September 1939 was followed by the “Phony War,” which lasted until May. 
   But neither the Russians, who had seized eastern Poland in mid-September, nor the 
  Germans were quiet.  Russia annexed the Baltic states, then invaded Finland at the end 
  of November, resulting in its expulsion from the League of Nations.  The Phony War 
  became a shooting war in the West when the Germans seized Denmark and Norway in 
  April and then launched the Blitzkrieg against the Low Countries and France in May.  All 
  through this period Hitler monopolized the initiative; his foes merely reacted.  The real 
  issue is: Why did Hitler finally fail?  (123-27) 
 
7. The Role of the Individual  What aspects of Hitler’s personality brought on global war 
  and failure?  How did he misjudge the United States?  (128) 
 
8. Systemic and Domestic Causes  At the structural level, what made the Versailles 
  Treaty too harsh and too lenient at the same time (here analogies might be made with 
  the conclusion of the Gulf War)?  Identify three domestic-level changes.  Food for 
 thought: What domestic-level factors shape American policy today?  How do the 
 various causes fit together?  (128-29) 
 
9. Was War Inevitable?  What might the Western democracies have done differently? 
  When did war become virtually inevitable?  (130-31) 
 
10. The Pacific War  What was the economic and political context in which Japan began 
 to impose its East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere?  After Japan’s seizure of French Indochina 
  following the fall of France, what three options could the militarists have exercised?  Why 
  did they choose to move against the United States?  How did the three levels of 
  analysis work together?  (131-35) 
 
11. Appeasement and Two Types of War  In the author’s judgment, when was 
  appeasement appropriate?  Inappropriate?  (135-37) 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  THE COLD WAR 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. Deterrence and Containment  Distinguish between deterrence and containment.  
Give examples of each.  (142-43) 
 
2. Explaining the Cold War: Three Approaches  Identify the three main schools of 
opinion on the causes of the Cold War.  What evidence does each school of opinion cite 
in favor of its view?  How do hard revisionists differ from soft revisionists?  Basically, 
what view does John Lewis Gaddis take today?  (143-46) 
 
3. Roosevelt’s Policies, Stalin’s Policies  Why did Roosevelt demand unconditional 
surrender?  What are some examples of Soviet pragmatism during the war?  (146-48) 
 
4. Phases of the Conflict  Identify the six issues that contributed to the eventual change 
from Roosevelt’s strategy to the onset of the Cold War.  What happened to the lend-
lease aid program?  From Kennan’s and Litvinov’s perspectives, why would 
appeasement have failed to work?  What did Kennan object to in the Truman Doctrine?  
What was the rationale for the Marshall Plan?  What caused Truman finally to sign NSC-
68 in June 1950?  (148-53) 
 
5. Inevitability?  Where do the different schools get the picture right or wrong?  What 
  alternative strategies may eased the tensions?  But the nature of Communism should be 
  kept firmly in mind, particularly the terrorist component cited by Anna Geifman.  (153-55) 
 
6. Levels of Analysis  What did Alexis de Tocqueville predict (in 1835)? 
 
There are at the present time two great nations in the world, which started from 
different points, but seem to tend towards the same end.  I allude to the Russians 
and the Americans. . . . All other nations seem to have nearly reached their 
natural limits, and they have only to maintain their power; but these are still in the 
act of growth.  All the others have stopped, or continue to advance with extreme 
difficulty; these alone are proceeding with ease and celerity along a path to which 
no limited can be perceived. . . . The American struggles against the obstacles 
which nature opposes to him; the adversaries of the Russian are men.  The 
former combats the wilderness and savage life; the latter, civilization with all its 
arms. The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends, 
and gives free scope to the unguided strength and common sense of the people; 
the Russian centres all the authority of society in a single arm.  The principal 
instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter, servitude.  Their starting-point is 
different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems marked 
out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.” 
 
 What changed between the two powers after the war?  What were the two roots of Soviet 
  foreign policy?  Identify four peculiarities of Russian political culture.  What did the 
  communist system add?  Identify four peculiarities of American political culture.  How has 
  the affected the American foreign policy process [which is often described as oscillating 
  between introversion and extroversion]?  (155-57) 
 
6. U.S. and Soviet Goals in the Cold War  Distinguish between possession goals and 
  milieu goals.  How did Soviet expansionism differ from Hitler’s?  Is there evidence of a 
  more threatening nature?  What was George Kennan’s idea of containment?  What 
  was the rationale for American aid to Yugoslavia?  What change after the Korean War? 
   What were some signs of a thaw in the Cold War after Stalin’s death?  Why did 
  Khrushchev’s approach fail?  What was détente?  How did the Nixon Administration 
  make use of it as a means to pursue the goals of containment?  Identify three trends in 
  the 1970s that undercut it?  (157-59) 
 
7. Containment in Action: The Vietnam War  What motivated American military 
intervention in Vietnam?   
 
8. Motives, Means, and Consequences  What are the three dimensions of judgment 
associated with the just war tradition?  Why do the authors believe the Vietnam War 
failed to meet any of the three dimensions?  How did changes in containment policy lead 
to intervention in Vietnam?  Why did George Kennan become disillusioned 
with containment?  (159-62) 
 
9. The Rest of the Cold War  How did Nikita Khrushchev’s actions weaken the Soviet 
  Union and intensify the Cold War?  Identify three trends in the 1970s that undercut 
 détente.  (165-67)  
 
10. The End of the Cold War  Identify some of the explanations for the end of the Cold War. 
   How do the three types of causes help clarify the timing of the end of the Cold War?   
Why was an individual, Mikhail Gorbachev, the most important precipitating cause?  [A 
  case can be made for adding Ronald Reagan].  How did Gorbachev’s policies, glasnost, 
  perestroika, and the new thinking, contribute to the Soviet collapse?  [The 1980s arms 
  race also contributed].  What was the role of liberal ideas and what Paul Kennedy calls 
  imperial overstretch?  What are some of the evidences of a loss of legitimacy? 
    Identify some deeper consequences of de-Stalinization in 1956, repressive measures in 
  the Soviet empire, and Soviet incompetence in face of the creative destruction (Joseph 
Schumpeter’s term) of capitalism?  What were the effects of IMF shock therapy?  (167- 
72) 
 
11. The Role of Nuclear Weapons: Physics and Politics  What was the Baruch Plan? 
   Identify five significant political effects of the H-bomb.  (172-76) 
 
12. Balance of Terror, Problems of Nuclear Deterrence   What made bipolarity a 
  particularly stable type of system?  What is the reasoning behind nuclear deterrence 
(especially in the context of a second-strike capability)?  What accounts for early self-
restraint?   (176-79) 
 
13. The Cuban Missile Crisis  Identify various views that attempt to account for the peaceful 
  resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  What were the American options?  How did its 
  resolution a compromise?  (179-82) 
 
14. Moral Issues  How could nuclear war fit the just war theory?  What are some of the 
  continuing concerns about the potential use of nuclear weapons?  (182-84) 
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CHAPTER SIX:  POST-COLD WAR COOPERATION, 
CONFLICT, FLASHPOINTS 
 
Study Questions 
 1. Managing Conflict  What are the four main types of goods from an economic 
standpoint?  Garrett Hardin coined the term tragedy of the commons, which refers to 
the dilemma created when multiple actors, who are otherwise rationally pursuing their 
own self-interest, deplete a shared limited resource.  Mineral depletion allowances, 
fishing license, grazing fees, and common law riparian rights have been traditional 
mechanisms for helping conserve commonly held resources.  Some communities in 
Oregon claim all of the rain that falls within a given watershed.  How does cooperation 
affect the allocation and use of private goods and club goods?  What of the international 
dimension?  How were Cold War conflicts usually managed?  (193-96) 
 
2. International Law and Organization  Why is international organization not an incipient 
  world government?  How does international law differ from domestic law, especially 
  regarding enforcement and adjudication?  Why are states interested in international law? 
  (196-99) 
 
3. The United Nations: Collective Security and Peacekeeping  Identify some of the 
  formal steps taken in the development of international law and collective security?  How 
  does the U.N. Security Council work?  What are some of the difficulties in defining 
  aggression?  Dag Hammarskjöld and Lester Pearson took the lead in developing what 
was called preventive diplomacy as part of the UN’s peacekeeping mission (“blue 
helmet” missions).  Why was U.N. collective security used in 1990 for the first time 
  since the Korean War?  What are some of the remaining practical limitations on collective 
  security?  What is meant by peacebuilding in Timor-Leste?  Why is it difficult to reform 
 the United Nations?  (200-06)  
 
4. Intrastate Conflict  How are the worst ethnic or communal wars generally fueled?  What 
are failed states?  How do constructivists analyze such conflicts as the Rwanda 
genocide of 1994 and the ethnic violence that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia?  
Some theorists attribute ethnic conflict to a Freudian “narcissism of small differences?”  
Political entrepreneurs and violent groups seek to shape or reconstruct the political 
identity of political groups by manipulating ethnic myths and fears.  Why is 
nonintervention a powerful norm of international law?  Illustrate some of the forms 
intervention may take, as in the case of economic assistance, electioneering, and the 
sending of military advisers?  What makes intervention hard to define?  (206-11) 
 
5. Judging Intervention  How do realists, cosmopolitans, and state moralists differ in their 
  views of intervention?  Which school of thought is most apt to support humanitarian 
  intervention?  What were the Brezhnev Doctrine [the Soviet Union committed itself to 
  prevent any parts of its empire from seceding or being overthrown] and the Reagan 
  Doctrine?  A book entitled Reagan’s War argues that Ronald Reagan made the defeat of 
  Communism the central goal of his Administration, capping his own decades-long 
  struggle against Communism in Hollywood and public life.  (211-12) 
 
6.   Exceptions to the Rule of Non-Intervention  Identify Michael Walzer’s four situations in 
  which war or military intervention may be justified.  What are some of the strengths and 
  weaknesses of these arguments?  (212-13) 
 
7. Problems of Self-Determination  What are some of the problems with intervention on 
  behalf of secessionist movements?  Why is the question of voting (in a plebiscite) so 
  complicated?  Does secession harm those who are left behind?  Why did Biafra’s 
  secession (1967-1970) create a problem for the rest of Nigeria?  What factors 
  complicated the issue of how to respond to ethnic cleansing in Bosnia?  Why then is 
  self-determination “an ambiguous moral principle?”  (213-15) 
 
8. Genocide and the “Responsibility to Protect”  How are state responsibilities to be 
balanced?  What is R2P?  What are some of the obstacles to internationalizing 
responsibility for peace?  How is genocide defined?  Political groups, however, were 
deliberately excluded from the definition at the time it was drafted.  What made Darfur an 
early acid test of R2P?  The “mission creep” that resulted in the overthrow of Gaddafi, 
which was not the express purpose of Res. 1973, has made Russia and China reluctant 
to take similar steps against Syria.  (215-18) 
 
9.  Interstate Conflict: Current Flashpoints  Why does John Mueller argue that major 
  interstate war has become “obsolescent?”  Why are the authors unconvinced?  (218-19) 
 
10. Middle East  Identify three factors at the root of so much Middle East conflict?  What 
  miscalculations led to the Iran-Iraq War?  How does nationalism cause war?  What are 
  the implications of the word being both descriptive and prescriptive?  How did this idea 
  arise and spread?  How has decolonization changed the nineteenth century model of 
  states?  What role has been played by the “pan” movements?  The so-called Arab Spring 
  may prove to be part of a transition from the predominance of pan-Arab national 
  socialism to Islamist communitarianism in the Middle East.  (219-22) 
 
11. The Arab-Israeli Conflict  Identify the eight wars produced by the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
What are some of the ambiguities of Resolution 242?  What changed following the Yom 
Kippur War which led to the Camp David Accords?  Why were these wars generally 
short?  What was the superpower role during the bipolar Cold War?  The shift from 
interstate to intrastate war and from regular military combat to asymmetrical conflict is 
part of a global pattern.  What are the Oslo and Geneva Accords (the Wye River Accord 
of 1998 is not mentioned)?  (222-30)   
 
12. The 1991 Gulf War and Its Aftermath  What reasons did Iraq have for invading Kuwait? 
   Why did the United States respond as it did?  Was the war necessary?  What did it 
  solve?  Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States and its allies overthrew the Taliban 
  government in Afghanistan and then the Iraqi regime.  What have been some of the 
  effects of Saddam Hussein’s removal from power?  How do the three levels of analysis 
  continue to interact?  (230-34) 
 
13. A Nuclear Iran?  What are the sources of Iranian power?  A factor in the destabilization 
  of Iran that is not mentioned is British/Soviet occupation of the country during WWII and 
  the continued occupation of the north by the Soviet Union for a year after the war and the 
  declaration of a People’s Republic of Azerbaijan and a Kurdish People’s Republic.  What 
 caused the Islamic revolution?  has been the Western response to Iran’s nuclear 
  ambitions?  (237-38) 
 
12. India and Pakistan  The maharaja of Kashmir, a Hindu, actually acceded to India, 
 although the population is predominantly Muslim.  What factors make conflict between 
 India and Pakistan especially worrisome?  (240-42) 
 
13. The South China Sea  How important is the sea in terms of resources and why is the 
  potential for international conflict there so serious?  (243-44) 
 
14. The Taiwan Strait  What is the historical background to the conflict?  Why does the Strait 
  remain dangerous?  (245-46) 
 
15. North Korea  Why does this impoverished, underdeveloped country pose a serious 
  regional security threat?  (248-49) 
 
APPENDIX 
 
The Suez Canal Crisis  What precipitated the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956?  What efforts were 
made to solve the problem peacefully?  How and why did Israel get involved?  What role was 
played by the United Nations?  What is the purpose of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242?  
(169-71) 
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  GLOBALIZATION AND 
INDEPENDENCE 
 
Outline 
 
A. INTRODUCTION  (255) 
 1. Fault Line Between Those with Skills and Mobility and Those Without 
 2, New Competition Among States in “geoeconomics” [cf. Walter Russell Mead’s 
  millennial capitalism] 
B. THE DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION  (255-58) 
 1. Globalization: Worldwide Networks of Interdependence 
  a. It does not imply universality 
 2. It Has Made National Boundaries More Porous 
  a. Homogenization does not follow from globalization 
 3. Three Dimensions: 
 4. Environmental 
  a. Smallpox 
  b. Black Death 
  c. HIV/AIDS 
  d. Exotic flora and fauna 
  e. Global climate change 
 5. Military 
  a. World-straddling alliances 
  b. Missiles 
 6. Social 
  a. American population 
  b. Four great world religions 
  c. Spread of constitutional arrangements and political ideas 
C. WHAT’S NEW ABOUT TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GLOBALIZATION?  (258-59) 
 1. Network Effects 
  a. Joseph Stiglitz: Spillover Effects 
 2. Thickness 
 3. Quickness 
 4. Direct Public Participation 
  a. Democratization 
  b. Pluralization 
   
Study Questions 
 
1. Dimensions of Globalization  What is meant by “geoeconomics”?  Why does 
  globalization not imply universality?  Identify its three chief dimensions.  What is 
  happening with the pace of environmental change?  What are some of the features of 
  political globalization?  (255-58) 
 
2. What’s New  Identify four effects of contemporary globalization that reveal it to be 
  “farther, faster, cheaper and deeper,” according to Thomas Friedman [cf. the Olympics: 
  faster, higher, stronger].   (258-59) 
 
3. Political Reactions to Globalization  How do different societies accommodate change? 
  What is some of the evidence of increasing inequality between people in the richest 
countries and people in the poorest?  [In The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (1998), 
David S. Landes, a Harvard economic historian, maintained that the income difference 
between Switzerland and Madagascar is about 400:1].  What have been some of the 
effects of the market forces unleashed by the Industrial Revolution?  What is meant by 
“useful inefficiencies”?  (259-61) 
 
3. The Concept of Interdependence  How do statesmen and analysts differ in their use of 
political words?  As an analytic word, what is interdependence?  What are some 
sources of interdependence?  Why did the collapse of the Soviet bring relief in the West 
rather than cause anxiety?  Why did the cost of bread rise in the 1970s?  What happened 
when the United States decided in 1973 to stop exporting soybeans to Japan?  Why is 
the distribution of benefits a “zero-sum game”?  Why does the distinction between 
domestic and foreign affairs become blurred?  Why does classical balance of power 
theory not fit economic interdependence very well?  (261-64) 
 
4. Costs of Interdependence  Distinguish between short-term sensitivity and long-term 
vulnerability.  Identify three factors involved by vulnerability.  What was behind the error 
in Lester Brown’s prediction that the United States would be dependent on imports of 10 
of the basic 13 industrial raw materials by 1985?  (264-66) 
 
5. Symmetry of Interdependence  When the United States became dependent on 
imported Japanese capital to balance its federal budget in the 1980s, did this give Japan 
either a political or a trade advantage?  How can manipulation of asymmetries be a 
source of power in the politics of interdependence?  What is linkage?  How do 
international institutions sometimes set the rules for trade-offs?   Even though Canada is 
more dependent on the United States than vice versa, what accounts for its ability to 
prevail in a number of disputes between them?  What is the effect of pacts such as 
NAFTA?  (266-69) 
 
6. Leadership in the World Economy  Why did hegemony over the international economy 
shift from Great Britain to the United States?  What crisis occurred due to the American 
unwillingness to live up to its new responsibilities?  What are some of the key institutions 
of the post-WWII international economic regime?  How do the ideas of realism and 
complex interdependence describe the US/China relationship?  (269-75) 
 
7. The Politics of Oil  What were the characteristics of the international oil regime in 1960?  
What is OPEC?  What are some explanations for the changes in the balance of power in 
the Persian Gulf?  What changes were evident as a result of the Arab oil embargo of 
1973?  Describe three explanations of the changes in the international oil regime.  What 
are the particulars of each?  Why was the oil weapon not more effective?  (208-13) 
 
8. Oil as a Power Resource  How did the OPEC oil embargo of 1973 modify American 
foreign policy?   How did reciprocity of independence affect the use of oil as a weapon?  
One factor is that Saudi Arabia was deeply worried about the Soviet Union, just as it is 
deeply worried about Iran today.  What are some non-OPEC oil sources?   What are 
some unconventional sources of oil?  
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CHAPTER EIGHT:  THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION 
AND TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. Power and the Information Revolution  Why have governments always worried about 
the flow and control of information?  How did Gutenberg’s invention of movable type 
change the world?  What is the key characteristic of the information revolution, which is 
sometimes called the Third Industrial Revolution?  What changes were wrought by the 
first two industrial revolutions?  What is meant by the management of scale?  Why does 
productivity growth lag?  What were the political effects of mass communication and 
broadcasting?  How and why have they changed?  How is Internet lessening the control 
of governments over their agendas?  (286-90) 
 
2. A New World Politics?  Does the information revolution tend to equalize power among 
nations?  According to realists, what trends aid the already large and powerful?  What are 
“network effects?”  GPS and navigation systems are widely available but information 
systems also create vulnerabilities.  A revolution in military affairs also strengthens 
already powerful countries?  Why are most information shapers democracies?  Why are 
closed systems more costly?  What conclusions does the author draw about the 
information revolution?  How, according to Peter Drucker and the Tofflers, is the 
information revolution bringing an end to the hierarchical bureaucratic organizations  
(cyber-feudalism) that typified the industrial revolution and the Westphalian state 
system?   The term “cybernetics” -- which was introduced by the scientist and 
philosopher, Norbert Wiener, in the 1940s -- is derived from the Greek root kubernetes 
[pilot or steersman], as governor is derived from the Latin equivalent.  (290-94) 
 
3. Sovereignty and Control  What are the implications of the communications revolution 
for national identity, loyalty, and sovereignty?  What changed as a result of medieval 
trade fairs (e.g., Scarborough Fair)?   
 
NOTE:  Serfs who escaped to live and work in the medieval free cities won their freedom after a 
year and a day: “Stadtluft macht frei” [city airs makes (one) free].  Hitler’s concentration camps 
changed the slogan to “Arbeit macht frei” [work makes one free].  The lex mercatoria [merchant 
or market law] was developed as a private set of rules, complete with courts, for conducting 
business.  In The Mystery of Capital, the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto examines the 
development of property protections on the American frontier and commends the American model 
for land reform in Third World areas.   
 
The ideas of complex interdependence and transnational actors are not at all new.  Cf. Adda B. 
Bozeman on the origins of the Hanseatic League in Politics and Culture in International History 
(1960):   
 
“The objective and subjective factors that had distinguished the Western 
European approach to peace and unity in religious, political, and intellectual 
matters, and had given rise, in consequence, to the permanent establishment of 
the three great concerts or “virtues” of the Church, the Empire, and the University 
of Paris, and the ad hoc assembling of all European interests at Constance were 
operative also in the field of Europe’s economic life where they called forth a 
remarkable movement toward federalism among the rising groups of townsmen 
and merchants.” 
 
“This impulse toward corporate unity was particularly strong north of the Alps, 
where the absence of a protective secular international order was felt more 
keenly than in Italy.  Here, in the midst of political confusion, where travelling 
merchants had long been in the habit of carrying their special merchant law with 
them, and where cities had evolved their own law in protection of their special 
peace, certain German towns recorded what may be the most suggestive 
chapter in the annals of inter-European constitutionalism when they formed the 
transterritorial League of Hanseatic cities.” 
 
“The North European scene in which the German merchants operated before the 
twelfth century . . . presented greater hazards and greater opportunities for 
adventurous action than the southern region.  East of the river Elbe spread the 
vast territorial expanse of rural, pagan Slavdom.  Here the pioneering merchants 
are known to have conducted a border trade as early as the ninth century A.D.  
This penetration, later supported by organized campaigns of colonization and 
Christianization, brought the entering Germans into contact with local rulers 
under whose protection they proceeded to found and build numerous towns.  
Lübeck, renowned in later centuries as the leader of the Hanseatic League, was 
the first of these settlements that pointed, chainlike, toward the magnetic market 
of Novgorod.  From the eastern ports of the “new” Germany the companies 
pushed to the farthest Baltic coast, gained economic control over the Baltic Sea, 
and established a direct route between these northern waters and the Black Sea 
by traveling on the Oder or the Vistula to Cracow, and thence on the Pruth or 
Dniester to their southern ports of destination.”   
. . . . 
“The recognition granted the Germans abroad coincided with the constitutional 
status that the trading companies had evolved for themselves, for all Germans 
who were natives of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation were actually 
organized at this time as  universitas communium mercatorium.  This first all-
German universitas, the predecessor of the Hanseatic League, united the 
merchants of over thirty towns, from Cologne and Utrecht in the west to Reval in 
the east, and had its headquarters on the island of Gotland, then known as the 
axis and most celebrated market of Europe.”  (505-06) 
 
How does the transition from the medieval to the modern political world illustrate the resistance, 
slowness, or lag of political institutions in responding to change?  Identify some of “the growing 
list of problems that are difficult to control within sovereign borders.”  How do competing 
sovereignties affect border control, national security, and human rights?  How have human rights 
issues effectively modified the UN rule against intervention?  How do cross-cutting identities 
(like “cross-cutting cleavages”) and cosmopolitan identities complicate the existing mix of 
loyalties?  How have diaspora communities (exiles, such as the Iraqis in America who voted in 
the 2005 election) used Internet to stay politically involved with their home country?  What are 
“flash movements?”  How does Arab Spring demonstrate the transformative power of the 
Internet?  What is James Rosenau’s “fragmegration?”  (294-99) 
 
4. What are transnational actors?  How do they add to the blurring of foreign and domestic 
politics even within the bureaucracy?  What economic interests in America were not 
unhappy that OPEC raised oil prices?  What is one of the distinguishing characteristics if 
complex interdependence?  Give some examples of NGOs.  (299-306) 
 
5. The Information Revolution and Complex Interdependence  What is meant by the 
“paradox of plenty?”  What does the author mean when he writes: “Now credibility is the 
crucial resource,” and “Politics has become a contest of competitive credibility?”  What 
are the implications of a shift from broadcasting to narrowcasting?  (306-08) 
 
6. Transnational Terrorism and the “War on Terror”  How does Daniel Gilbert view the 
psychology of terrorism?  How does the death toll from terrorism compare with that from 
drug cartels and paramilitaries (which may also be considered terrorist organizations)?  
How does an organization like al-Qaeda threaten American democracy?  What is the 
most effective way of combating transnational terrorism?  (308-    ) 
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CHAPTER NINE:  WHAT CAN WE EXPECT IN THE 
FUTURE? 
 
Outline 
 
A. ALTERNATIVE VISIONS  (316-20) 
1. Self-Help Realm 
2. Arnold Toynbee: Nation-State vs. Fission 
3. Large Territorial State as the Post-Westphalian Norm 
4. Five Alternatives 
a. World Federalism 
b. Functionalism 
c. Regionalism: Jean Monnet, Schumann Plan, Treaty of Rome (EU) 
d. Ecologism: Richard Falk 
e. Cyber-Feudalism: Peter Drucker, the Tofflers, Esther Dyson 
(1) Crosscutting Communities 
(2) Terrorists 
(3) Thomas Hobbes 
5. Political Goals: Physical Security, Economic Well-Being, Communal Identity 
6. Changing Context 
a. Divisiveness: Religious and Nationalistic Cleavages 
b. Economic Integration vs. Political Fragmentation 
7. Communications and Diplomacy 
a. CNN 
b. Synchronization 
8. “Narrowcasting” of Information 
a. Marshall McLuhan’s Global Village  
B. THE END OF HISTORY OR THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?  (320-23) 
1. Francis Fukuyama’s End of History 
a. Deep Ideological Cleavages 
b. Success of Liberal Capitalism 
c. Post-Cold War Return of History 
2. Samuel P. Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations 
a. Toynbee’s Civilizations 
3. Critique 
4. Nationalism 
5. East vs. West Europe 
6. Explanations 
a. Role of Economic Growth 
b. Democratic Processes 
c. Regional Institutions 
7. Persistence of National Identity 
a. French and Germans 
b. Immigration 
c. Failure to Assimilate Immigrants 
d. Xenophobes 
C. TECHNOLOGY AND THE DIFFUSION OF POWER  (323-25) 
1. Diffusion of Power 
a. Erosion of Control 
b. Trends 
2. Consequences 
a. Islands of Democratic Peace vs. a New Feudalism 
3. Benign Vision: NGOs 
4. MNCs 
5. Confusion of Identity 
6. Protectionism 
D. PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (325-27) 
1. Malign Vision 
a. WMDs 
b. Proliferation 
2. Nuclear Club 
3. Cold War Obstacles to Nuclear Proliferation 
a. Cold War Alliance Structure 
b. Superpower Cooperation 
(1) Nuclear Suppliers Group 
c. Treaties and Institutions 
(1) India Cheated 
4. Collapse of Soviet Alliance Guarantees 
E. TRANSNATIONAL CHALLENGES TO SECURITY  (327-330) 
1. Definition of Terrorism 
2. George W. Bush and Just War Doctrine 
  a. Wars of national liberation 
  b. State war crimes 
3. Transnational Terrorism Analogized with the Piracy of an Earlier Era 
a. Vulnerability of modern systems 
b. enhanced appreciation of the role of states 
 4. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
a. Fissile materials 
b. Biological Agents 
c. Transnational Terrorism 
d. Aum Shinrikyo 
5. Netwars: Attacks on Information Systems 
6. Inadequacy of Deterrence 
a. State Terrorism 
b. Panama’s Manuel Noriega 
7. The Great Fear (La Grande Peur, 1789) 
 a. Use by terrorism by revolutionary France, anarchists, Germany, Russia 
8. Difficulty in Organizing Trustworthy Cells [Lenin was the master organizer] 
  a. Proliferation of jihadist websites 
F. CYBERWARFARE  (330-31) 
1. Critical Infrastructure 
  a. Vulnerability of electric power grids [including to electromagnetic pulse 
    (EMP) attacks] 
2. Diffusion of Power from Central Governments to Individuals [a good argument for 
   returning to federalism and decentralization] 
  a. Examples of cyber-attacks: Philippines, Estonia, Georgia, Iran 
  b. Stuxnet is one of an ensemble of computer viruses attacking the Iranian 
   nuclear program 
G. PANDEMICS  (331-33) 
 1. Spanish Flu, 1918-1920 
a. Perhaps a quarter of the world’s population was infected; perhaps 50-
120 million died 
 2. HIV: Death toll is more than 25 million 
 3. Exotic (Imported) Diseases: West Nile. H1N1, Tuberculosis 
H. CLIMATE CHANGE  (333-36) 
 1. Carbon Emissions: A Negative Externality 
  a. The issue of anthropogenic causes is still controversial within and 
    between differ parts of the scientific community 
 2. Effects of Climate Change 
 3. Ways of Reducing Carbon Emissions 
 4. Free-Rider Problem 
I. A NEW WORLD ORDER?  (337-38) 
1. Order 
a. Realists 
b. Liberals 
c. Constructivists 
2. Conspiracy Theories 
3. Lack of Definition 
J. FUTURE CONFIGURATIONS OF POWER  (338-41) 
1. Rapid Power Transitions 
2. Multipolarity 
3. Unipolar Hegemony 
a. Tripolar Economic Power 
4. Transnational Relations 
5. Three Economic Blocs: Europe, Asia, North America 
6. Multilevel Interdependence 
7. No American Hegemony 
G. THE PRISON OF OLD CONCEPTS  (341-43) 
1. Sui Generis [Self-Generating] System 
2. Realist View 
a. Erosion of Classical Conception 
3. Liberal View 
4. Security Council and the Doctrine of Collective Security 
5. Unforeseen Rise of Bipolarity 
6. Issue of Self-Determination 
H. THE EVOLUTION OF A HYBRID WORLD ORDER  (343-45) 
1. Human Rights 
a. Sanctions against South Africa 
b. Helsinki Accords 
2. Armed Multilateral Intervention 
3. U. N. Charter, Chapter VII 
4. What Realists and Liberals Must Recognize 
I. THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE  (345-46) 
1. Change 
a. Thucydides 
b. Kant 
2. Thinking about Different Ideal Types 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. Why did Arnold Toynbee believe that the nation-state and the split atom could not coexist 
on the same planet?  Identify five alternative futures.  What do people want from their 
political institutions?  How is the context of world politics changing?  What is meant by 
“narrowcasting”?  (316-20) 
 
2. Compare and contrast the theories of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel P. Huntington.  
What are some of the criticisms?  How does the author account for the virtual absence of 
intrastate conflict in Europe?  Is nationalism dead in Europe?  (320-23) 
 
3. What third vision of the future does the author offer?  Compare the benign with the 
malign vision?  How is transnational investment [Mead’s millennial capitalism] helping to 
confuse identities?  What were the chief obstacles to nuclear proliferation during the Cold 
War?  Why is deterrence inadequate to protect from terrorist threats?  What then is 
required?  (323-27) 
 
4. What is the nature of terrorism?  How does it compare with piracy in an earlier era? How 
important is the role of states, including failed states?  The combination of great fear and 
sophisticated technology makes for greater vulnerability and the “privatization of war.”  
(327-30) 
 
5. The vulnerability of critical infrastructure should be evident when considering cyber-
warfare, pandemics, and climate change.  Warfare over scarce resources is a distinct 
prospect.  What is the free rider problem?  
 
6. At a time of rapid power transitions following the Cold War, what future scenarios are 
usually invoked?  In “The Prison of Old Concepts,” what does the author find 
salvageable?  What does he mean by a “hybrid world order”?  Why must we understand 
both the realist and the liberal views of world politics?  (337-46) 
 
Review 
 
Arnold Toynbee  large territorial state and the five alternatives  Marshall McLuhan 
Richard Falk   what people want from their political institutions 
economic integration and political fragmentation   Francis Fukuyama 
Samuel P. Huntington  East vs. West Europe  diffusion of power 
benign vs. malign visions Cold War obstacles to nuclear proliferation 
terrorism   jihadist websites  critical infrastructure 
pandemics   climate change   negative externalities 
Darfur conflict   ways of reducing carbon emissions 
free rider problem  rapid power transitions   multipolarity 
problem of self-determination 
